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FACT AND OPINION IN DEFAMATION: RECOGNIZING THE
FORMATIVE POWER OF CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of modem first amendment litigation, courts continue
to struggle with the basic distinction between fact and opinion.' In his
1. An extreme example of the debate can be found in Milkovich v. News-Herald, 15
Ohio St. 3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), and Scott v.
News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). Both cases involved the same
sports column containing the statement "'[a ] nyone who attended the [event] knows in
his heart that [plaintiffs] lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell
the truth.'" Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 496 N.E.2d at 701 (quoting Diaduin, Maple
Beat the Law with the 'Big Lie,' News-Herald, Jan. 8, 1975); Milkovich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at
293, 473 N.E.2d at 1192 (same).
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the statement to be factual. See 15 Ohio
St. 3d at 298-99, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97. Two years later in Scott, after the composition
of the court had altered, it held the statement to be opinion. See 25 Ohio St. 3d at 254,
496 N.E.2d at 709. Based on that later decision, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Lake
County, affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants in
Milkovich's case. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20, 545 N.E.2d 1320,
appeal dismissed, 43 Ohio St. 3d 707, 540 N.E.2d 724 (1989). After sixteen years and
extensive litigation, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. See Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 863 (1990). In the words of one scholar, "[tlhe libel action
is an ungainly form of relief; it is neither quick, certain nor cheap." T. Emerson, The
System of Freedom of Expression 538 (1970).
A flood of commentary has appeared on the fact-opinion distinction. See generally
Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff 's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 Win.
& Mary L. Rev. 825, 869-80 (1984) (arguing fact/opinion distinction is irrelevant because
plaintiff must prove falsity); Heidig, Ollman v. Evans: Skinning the Membrane of Fact
Versus Opinion, 23 Tort & Ins. L.J. 232, 247 (1987) (discussing each Olman opinion and
suggesting that four-factor test be applied only when public figure involved); Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 603, 657-66 (1990) (distinguishing
between fact and opinion according to whether statement depends for its validity upon
standards or conventions of particular community, with constitutional privilege for opin-
ion justified to extent of allowing public debate about those community standards); Spell-
man, Fact or Opinion: Where to Draw the Line, 9 Comm. & Law, Dec. 1987, at 45, 61
(discussing Janklow and Ollman in casenote fashion, finding they provide "significant
protection" for the media); Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in Libel Law: The Second
Circuit Adopts a More Comprehensive Approach, 52 Brooklyn L. Rev. 879, 908-12 (1986)
(discussing Mr. Chow and arguing that opinion determination should consider whether
private or public plaintiff is involved); Note, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion,
and the First Amendment, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1001, 1019, 1055-56 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Statements of Fact] (finding Olman offers "verifiability test" providing bright-line rule);
Note, The Fact-Opinion Determination in Defamation, 1988 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 830-31
[hereinafter Note, Fact-Opinion Determination] (arguing that courts making distinction
should look to explicitness of statement and whether it implicates "core first amendment
values"); Note, Will Words Never Hurt?-Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 19 Creighton L.
Rev. 1015, 1034-35 (1986) (discussing Janklow before en banc reversal and suggesting
first amendment principles be balanced in four-factor test); Note, The Fact-Opinion Dis-
tinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 Geo. L.J.
1817, 1845-49 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Need for a Bright-Line Rule] (finding Olman
vague, unpredictable and leading to self-censorship); Note, Structuring Defamation Law
to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determination: A Critique of Ollman v. Evans, 71 Iowa L.
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book about political and legal disputes on an Indian reservation, In the
Spirit of Crazy Horse, Peter Matthiessen found the conclusion "'all but
inescapable'" that the plaintiff FBI agent "'knowingly prepared [a wit-
ness] to give false testimony' "at a criminal trial.2 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held this to be a constitutionally protected state-
ment of opinion.3 In contrast, a television anchorman in Chicago, during
the "Perspective" section of a newscast, criticized a cigarette company
for its advertisements, concluding that" '[t]hey're not slicksters. They're
liars.' "' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held this accusa-
tion of dishonesty to be a defamatory statement of fact.5
On their face, these contradictory holdings seem odd: the milder accu-
sation, "liar," was actionable, while a supposedly stronger allegation of
criminal subornation of perjury and obstruction of justice was not. Even
more striking, however, each court asserted that it distinguished fact
from opinion by using the influential four-factor test formulated in
Olman v. Evans.6 The Olman test requires consideration of a state-
ment's precision, verifiability, literary context and social context when
separating fact from opinion.7
In practice, the courts have given qualitatively different emphases to
Olman's four-factor analysis. These strikingly varied outcomes depend
upon whether greater stress is placed on the abstract precision and ver-
ifiability of a statement, or on the literary and social context in which the
statement was made. Emphasizing the non-contextual factors of preci-
Rev. 913 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Structuring Defamation Law] (finding fact/opinion
distinction unnecessary, and arguing that Ollman allows judge to usurp jury's role); Note,
The Fact/Opinion Distinction: An Analysis of the Subjectivity of Language and Law, 70
Marq. L. Rev. 673, 680-83 (1987) (arguing, perhaps unnecessarily, that words are ambig-
uous and fact/opinion distinction would be difficult to draw); Note, Fact and Opinion
After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 81,
83 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Evolution of a Privilege] (arguing that Gertz should not be
read to create a privilege for opinion); Note, Defamation-Actionable Statement of Fact
Versus Privileged Opinion: Ollman v. Evans, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 367, 383-85 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Defamation] (finding Ollman amounts to elaborate ad hoc judgment
call, providing no clear guidance); Note, Protecting Satire Against Libel Claims: A New
Reading of the First Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98 Yale L.J. 1215, 1234 (1989) (ar-
guing that satire should always be considered privileged opinion); Comment, Allegations
of Criminal Conduct: Application of the Fact-Opinion Dichotomy in Defamation Actions,
49 Ohio St. L.J. 293, 319 (1988) (arguing that precision prong of Ollman test should be
given "tremendous" weight so as to protect those accused of criminal conduct); Casenote,
Janldow v. Newsweek: Confusion Persists in the Distinction Between Fact and Opinion in
Defamation Actions, 54 UMKC L. Rev. 704, 717 (1986) (finding Olman and Janklow
vague and ambiguous, and hoping for Supreme Court guidance).
2. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc, 881 F.2d 1426, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting P.
Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 98 (1982)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
3. See id.
4. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir.
1987) (quoting Walter Jacobson's Perspective (WBBM-TV (CBS) broadcast, Nov. 11,
1981)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
5. See id. at 1130-31.
6. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
7. See id. at 979.
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sion and verifiability, however, ignores the formative character of context
and makes context merely an external and exculpatory consideration.
The Note argues that the last two factors of the Olman test, literary
and social context, should receive primary emphasis. Part I analyzes the
Supreme Court's treatment of the fact/opinion distinction, particularly
the Court's focus on the context in which statements were made. Part II
examines the Olman test and its recent, divergent applications. Part III
argues that literary and social contexts always determine the expecta-
tions of a reasonable audience, and concludes that any analysis of preci-
sion or verifiability must be subordinated to an examination of the
context in which a statement appeared. Only by such an explicit consid-
eration of context can speech be protected.
I. CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION
A. Fair Comment and Opinion Before Gertz
The common law often treated the fact-opinion distinction under the
doctrine of fair comment, which provided a qualified privilege for certain
statements of opinion.' A defendant could invoke the fair comment priv-
ilege by proving that (1) the statement concerned a matter of legitimate
public interest, (2) the facts upon which the statement was based were
either stated or known to the reader, (3) the statement was the actual
opinion of the defendant, and (4) the statement was not motivated solely
by the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff.9
The fair comment privilege protected the defendant's right to discuss
public affairs and the public's right to information on such issues. ' ° The
8. See, eg., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530, 539 (6th Cir. 1893) (criticism
and comment privileged, but false allegations of facts are not); Burt v. Advertiser News-
paper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891) (what is privileged is criticism, not
statement of fact); Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 359, 83 N.W. 110, 112-13 (1900)
(defendant has right to express opinion as long as only true facts are stated and inferences
drawn are honest belief); Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 336 Mo. 184, 201, 78 S.W.
2d 404, 413 (1934) (comment on facts privileged as long as conclusions not stated as
facts). See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton
on the Law of Torts § 115, at 831-32 (5th ed. 1984) (discusses topics open to "fair com-
ment"); Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An
Alternative to "Actual Malice," 30 De Paul L. Rev. 1, 47 (1980) (argues that fair com-
ment privilege should be emphasized instead of "actual malice" issue in order to protect
libel defendants effectively); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 Tex. L. Rev. 41 (1929) (long dis-
cussion of fair comment, suggesting that courts have ignored larger issues for minute
attention to particular statements); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opin-
ion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1203, 1211-15 (1962) (ar-
gues that fact-opinion distinction should be irrelevant to fair comment defense); Note,
Fair Comment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1207, 1207 (1949) (briefly discusses fair comment).
9. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 974 n.5 (citing Restatement of Torts § 606 (1934)).
10. See generally Restatement of Torts § 606, comment c (1934) ("If the public is to
be aided in forming its judgment upon matters of public interest by a free interchange of
opinion, it is essential that honest criticism and comment, no matter how foolish or
prejudiced, be privileged."); Titus, supra note 8, at 1206 (fair comment protects defend-
ant's right to speak and public's right to know about matters of legitimate public inter-
1990]
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privilege, however, was fairly narrow. It protected opinions only on mat-
ters of public interest; the judge determined the exact contours of public
interest.II Fair comment doctrine also allowed the jury considerable lati-
tude; even if the topic was held to be of public interest, the libel plaintiff
still could defeat the privilege by persuading the jury that the defendant
did not honestly hold the contested opinion, or that the defendant stated
the opinion out of a malicious motive.12
With its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"3 the
Supreme Court redefined the area of libel litigation and turned much of
the discussion away from the fact-opinion distinction. To recover libel
damages after New York Times, public figures must prove that the de-
fendant acted with "actual malice," that is, with the knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or
false.14 Rather than distinguishing between fact and opinion, libel cases
focused on the status of the plaintiff as public or private figure and the
degree of fault attributable to the defendant. 5
The New York Times Court noted, however, that under the first and
fourteenth amendments "a defense of fair comment must be afforded for
honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, state-
ments of fact."1 6 Thus, the Court recognized that fair comment did have
a constitutional dimension, although its contours were not clear. The
Court went on to state that such a defense would be defeasible if the
public official plaintiff proved "actual malice."17 Because the Court ex-
plicitly referred to public scrutiny of a police department, the fair com-
ment elements of public interest, basis on stated facts, and honest belief
were still in place.
By making fair comment defeasible by proof of actual malice, how-
ever, the Court perhaps weakened the privilege-at least in cases which
involved a public official. Under the common law, the fair comment
privilege could be defeated by proof of a malicious motive. The New
York Times footnote made the privilege refutable by proof of actual mal-
ice. Proving actual malice could be much easier in some cases than prov-
est). Lord Ellenborough provided a rationale for fair comment that stressed the necessity
of free discussion to the health of society: "Liberty of criticism must be allowed, or we
should neither have purity of taste nor of morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary
to the truth of history, and the advancement of science." Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep.
981, 982 (1808).
11. See Note, Evolution of a Privilege, supra note 1, at 86-89 (discussing range of
topics held to be of public interest and finding that charges of corruption leveled against
public officials were often held not to be of public interest).
12. See id. at 86.
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. See id. at 279-80.
15. See R. Smolla, Suing the Press 54-60 (1986); Carman, supra note 8, at 1; Note,
Evolution of a Privilege, supra note 1, at 90-91.
16. 376 U.S. at 292 n.30.
17. See id.
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ing a malicious motive towards the plaintiff."s
B. Creation of a Constitutional Privilege for Opinion
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.," the Supreme Court revitalized the
fact-opinion distinction:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact.20
Although this was dictum, many federal and state courts have taken it to
establish an absolute constitutional privilege for statements of opinion.2'
In the words of Ollman, "Gertz's implicit command thus imposes upon
both state and federal courts the duty as a matter of constitutional adju-
dication to distinguish facts from opinions in order to provide opinions
with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection. '22  The
Supreme Court has mentioned the Gertz dictum with approval.23
This new constitutional privilege has largely supplanted the common-
law doctrine of fair comment.2 4 Courts generally agree that distinction
between defamatory statement of fact and protected statement of opinion
is a question of law, not a question of fact for the jury.2 Thus courts can
18. Cf T. Emerson, supra note 1, at 540 ("The risk of incurring liability for an opin-
ion considered by a jury to be 'unfair' or 'malicious' would surely create much greater
and more widespread self-censorship than that found decisive in New York Times.").
19. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
20. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
21. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1989); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302
(8th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A.,
759 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1985); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74
N.Y.2d 548, 555-56, 549 N.E.2d 129, 132, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (1989).
22. Olman, 750 F.2d at 975. On the danger of courts ruling on the truth or falsity of
opinions, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Any nation which counts the Scopes trial [on the teaching of
evolution] as part of its heritage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury
finding of falsity."); see also Post, supra note 1, at 664 ("[O]pinions are in their nature
debatable. To impose sanctions for 'false' opinions is to use the force of law to end this
potential debate by imposing legally definitive interpretations of the cultural standards at
issue.").
23. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984). But see Ollman v. Evans,
471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("lower
courts have seized upon the word 'opinion' in [Gertz] to solve with a meat axe a very
subtle and difficult question"); Note, Evolution of a Privilege, supra note 1, at 83 (rejecting
claim that Gertz established absolute opinion privilege).
24. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 975; Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227,
1233 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Wade,
The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671, 694-95 (1977).
25. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
use the opinion privilege to dismiss frivolous or wasteful defamation suits
before trial, and stem what Judge Bork has called the "freshening stream
of libel actions."26
C. Supreme Court Practice When Identifying Opinion
Although Gertz involved statements that the plaintiff was a "Commu-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 324 (1989); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1989); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 787
(Mo. 1985) (en banc).
26. Olman, 750 F.2d at 993 (Bork, J., concurring); see also id. at 996-97 (observing
that Sullivan has failed to protect the marketplace of ideas and perhaps some other de-
fense is needed, and advocating close judicial scrutiny to ensure that libel cases endanger-
ing first amendment do not reach jury); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d
548, 561, 549 N.E.2d 129, 135, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 944 (1989) (statement held opinion
only after extensive litigation and large settlements paid by other defendants, demonstrat-
ing chilling effect of libel suits and appropriateness of summary judgment); Schauer, The
Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 761, 765 (1986) (sug-
gesting that juries no longer protect speech, but rather speech must be protected from
them); Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 1, at 1026-27 (discussing high cost of libel
suits and consequent "chilling effect").
The "freshening stream" of libel suits derives from a phenomenon that has been called
the "thinning of the American skin." R. Smolla, supra note 15, at 16. According to
Professor Smolla, "everybody who's anybody has a libel suit going on the side." Id. at 6.
Defamation suits are not only frequent but expensive, with huge claims and proportion-
ately huge jury awards. Senator Paul Laxalt sued the Sacramento Bee for $250 million,
William Westmoreland demanded $120 million from CBS, and Ariel Sharon claimed $50
million damages against Time magazine. Bestselling novelist Jackie Collins was awarded
$40 million by the jury in her suit against Larry Flynt, while a former Miss Wyoming was
awarded $26 million against Penthouse. See id. at 5-6. According to two studies made in
the early 1980's, the average initial damage award in libel suits against the media was
over $2 million, with an additional $2 million in punitive damages. "These awards are
outrageously excessive. They are three times the average damage award in product liabil-
ity and medical malpractice actions." Goodale, Survey of Recent Media Verdicts, Their
Disposition on Appeal, and Media Defense Costs, in Practising Law Institute, Media Insur-
ance & Risk Management 69, 78 (1985). Libel plaintiffs also tend to win before the jury
more often than other tort plaintiffs, at a rate from 55 to 85 percent (compared with a
rate for medical malpractice plaintiffs of 30 to 40 percent). See R. Smolla, supra note 15,
at 73.
Even the truth often seems no defense against a hefty jury award. In Tavoulareas v.
Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987), the
Washington Post reported that plaintiff, the president of Mobil Oil, had "set up" his son
in the shipping business. Tavoulareas claimed that this statement implied nepotism on
his part, and sued for damages of $100 million. See R. Smolla, supra note 15, at 185. The
jury awarded him over $2 million, although the trial judge granted the defendant's mo-
tion for a judgment n.o.v. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
initially reversed the lower court and reinstated the verdict. Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d at
766. In an en banc rehearing, however, the D.C. Circuit finally affirmed the trial court,
holding that no reasonable jury could find the statements false. Id. at 786. "The undis-
puted evidence at trial, including plaintiff's own testimony, precludes any reasonable in-
ference that the central allegation of the challenged article-that Tavoulareas 'set up' [his
son]-was false." Id. at 783-84 (emphasis in original). "The record abounds with uncon-
tradicted evidence of nepotism in favor of [his son]." Id. at 785.
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nist-fronter" and possessed a criminal record,2 7 the decision provided lit-
tle help in distinguishing fact from opinion. Gertz actually held that
states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for
defamation of private figures, as long as liability is not imposed without
fault.2" One court has interpreted that absence of discussion of opinion
to imply that the statements in Gertz were factual in the view of the
Supreme Court. 9
Lower courts have consequently turned to other Supreme Court cases
for guidance, particularly Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v.
Bresler30 and Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Let-
ter Carriers v. Austin.3" In both cases, the Court emphasized the social
and literary context in which the statement appeared, rather than its pre-
cision or verifiability.32
In Greenbelt, a newspaper accurately reported statements made at a
city council meeting, characterizing the bargaining position taken by a
real estate developer as "blackmail." 33 The case could have been re-
versed simply on an incorrect jury instruction regarding actual malice.34
The Court reasoned, however, that an even more serious constitutional
error had been made: "as a matter of constitutional law, the word
'blackmail' in these circumstances was not slander when spoken, and not
libel when reported in the Greenbelt News Review."35
The Court then turned to the social context, pointing out that the
word "blackmail" was used during a heated public debate on a contro-
versial issue.36 The Court further noted that the newspaper performed a
legitimate public function by publishing full reports of the debates.37 The
Court examined the literary context of the statement, finding that the
newspaper's intention could be easily understood from the headlines, and
that the reports accurately portrayed what had occurred at the
27. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323, 326 (1974). Gertz might have been
a particularly promising situation for the Supreme Court to examine the precision, ver-
ifiability and context of disputed statements. Robert Welch, defendant in Gertz, founded
the extremely conservative John Birch Society and had accused many people, including
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, of being communists. He divided the American public
into four categories: "'Communists, Communist dupes or sympathizers, the uninformed
who have yet to be awakened to the Communist danger, and the ignorant.'" See R.
Smolla, supra note 15, at 61. Rather than exploring how context would shape the expec-
tations of a reasonable reader, the Supreme Court focused on Gertz's status as a private
figure. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
28. See id. at 347.
29. See Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. 398 U.S. 6 (1970)
31. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
32. See Oliman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
33. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7-8 (1970).
34. See id. at 11.
35. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
36. See id.
37. See id.
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meetings.38
The Court concluded that a reasonable reader, encountering the word
"blackmail" in this social and literary context, would not interpret it as
alleging a criminal offense.3 9 The decision did not discuss whether the
word "blackmail" has a precise meaning, relegating the legal definition to
a footnote. 4 On the facts of this case, "blackmail' effectively meant an
"extremely unreasonable" negotiating position.41 Similarly, the issue of
verifiability did not arise and the Court did not discuss whether the
charges of blackmail could be proved.
By focusing on the word in context, the Supreme Court analyzed the
function of the challenged statement, rather than any abstract dictionary
meaning.42 This is particularly evident in the Court's categorization of
the word "blackmail" as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet."4 As
38. See id. at 13-14.
39. In the words of the Court:
No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the
newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler with the com-
mission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader
must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a
vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating position ex-
tremely unreasonable. Indeed, the record is completely devoid of evidence that
anyone in the city of Greenbelt or anywhere else thought Bresler had been
charged with a crime.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
40. See id. at 14 n.7.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Dictionary meanings are quite varied and variable. The word "set," for example,
occupies 25 pages in the Oxford English Dictionary. See 15 Oxford English Dictionary
50-75 (2d ed. 1989). The Oxford English Dictionary also provides three definitions of the
noun "blackmail," including a rent reserved in labor, produce, etc., as opposed to "white
rents" paid in "white money" or silver. See 2 Oxford English Dictionary 250. We know
"blackmail" does not mean that here, because of context. In another context, for exam-
ple, a historical work on landlord-tenant relations in medieval England, that could be the
"proper" meaning of "blackmail."
The dangers of relying upon an abstract dictionary definition are exemplified in Stewart
v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d 888, 503 N.E.2d 580 (1987), where
defendant speculated that plaintiff belonged to Posse Comitatus, or a similar extremist
group. See id. at 890, 503 N.E.2d at 581. On the Posse Comitatus, see Foxman & Fin-
ger, Terrorism in the United States: 1986, in The 1986 Annual on Terrorism 67 (Y.
Alexander ed.), which links the group to far-right white supremacists and describes it as
"a violence-prone anti-Semitic organization which believes that all government power is
rooted at the county level."
The trial judge, uncertain about the "present-day meaning of the phrase," Stewart, 151
Ill. App. 3d at 894, 503 N.E.2d at 583, consulted his legal dictionary and found it defined
as the "portion of the population of the county which the sheriff may call upon for aid."
Id. at 893, 503 N.E.2d at 583 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1046 (5th ed. 1979)). The
appellate court agreed with plaintiff that such a definition in this context was "obviously"
wrong, but it still held the statement opinion. Id. at 893, 503 N.E,2d at 583.
Dictionaries are assembled for particular audiences and purposes. Selecting a diction-
ary and then relying upon its definitions are themselves interpretive choices, and lead to
further questions of whether the correct dictionary was chosen and whether the definition
is still accurate.
43. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
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rhetoric, the statement was not meant to report a factual situation, but to
persuade an audience to the speaker's point of view. Such an analysis of
function requires that the statement be considered in context.'
In Letter Carriers, decided the same day as Gertz, the Supreme Court
also made context the crucial consideration. The case involved a union
newsletter that listed the plaintiff non-members as "scabs" and offered
this definition of the term: "'a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country,
his family and his class.' "'5 The Court noted the strong disagreement
between the union and workers opposing unionization.46 In such a con-
text, the Court found it "impossible to believe that any reader.., would
have understood the newsletter to be charging the [plaintiffs] with com-
mitting the criminal offense of treason."'47
As in Greenbelt, the Court did not consider the precision or ver-
ifiability of the newsletter's use of the word "traitor." Instead, it looked
to the social context and newsletter medium in which the statement ap-
peared, and inferred from that context that the words were "figurative"
and "rhetorical. '4  The context delimited the meaning assigned to the
statement, so that "no such factual representation [could] reasonably be
inferred."49 The Court explicitly noted that identical or similar language
could be actionable in a different case with a differing set of contexts."0
Finally, the meaning of the statement was specifically analyzed in terms
of what "any reader" would understand, not the interpretation of the
actual readers of this case. 1
D. Problematic Attempts by Lower Courts to Identify Opinion
Courts have stressed repeatedly the difficulty of drawing a firm distinc-
tion between fact and opinion.52 Application of the distinction has re-
44. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
45. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 268 (1974) (quoting "The Scab," attributed to Jack London, as quoted in Carrier's
Comer, June, 1970) (Court's emphasis omitted).
46. See id. at 284.
47. Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 284, 286.
49. Id. at 286.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 285. However, Justice Powell, the author of the Gertz opinion, dis-
sented from Letter Carriers, suggesting that the statements were not hyperbole, but evi-
dently factual. See id. at 296 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Statements in union newsletters are not always considered opinion. For example, in
Judge Bork's dissent in American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,
830 F.2d 294, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1987), he applied the Olman test and argued that a state-
ment by the author of a newsletter column that he has opened and read mail was factual.
See also Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 287, 501 N.E.2d 550, 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d
901, 902 (1986) (plaintiff targeted with "scab" as well as "[w]hen she comes into a room,
the mice jump up on chairs"; statements held nonactionable opinion).
52. According to the Seventh Circuit, "[c]ourts trying to find one formula to separate
'fact' from 'opinion'... are engaged in a snipe hunt .... ." Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d
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suited in implausible and even recondite discriminations,5 3 leading
commentators to demand a bright-line test. 4 Problematic attempts to
distinguish fact from opinion have appeared, including a bright-line em-
phasis on verifiability, an "undisclosed defamatory facts" test, and a "to-
tality of the circumstances" test.
1. Suggested Bright-Line Verifiability Test
Many decisions make verifiability the primary criterion that distin-
guishes fact from opinion.5 5 A statement that could be proven true or
394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989); see also Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("Because of the richness and diversity
of language, as evidenced by the capacity of the same words to convey different meanings
in different contexts, it is quite impossible to lay down a bright-line or mechanical distinc-
tion."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 291,
501 N.E.2d 550, 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986) ("The infinite variety of meanings
conveyed by words--depending on the words themselves and their purpose, the circum-
stances surrounding their use, and the manner, tone and style with which they are used-
rules out, in our view, a formulistic approach.").
53. For example, Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985),
involved a harsh restaurant review including statements such as "'the sweet and sour
pork contained more dough (badly cooked) than meat,'" and "'the Peking lacquered
duck... was made up of only one dish (instead of the three traditional ones) .... '" Id.
at 221-22 (quoting an English translation from the French Gault/Millau Guide to New
York (1981)). The court held that the statement about the sweet and sour pork was a
hyperbolic expression of opinion. See id. at 229. The Peking duck statement, however,
raised the issue of what was traditional in Chinese cooking. See id. at 230. The court
held it was "clearly laden with factual content" and contained "allegations that are seem-
ingly capable of being proved true or false." Id. at 229.
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 894 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977),
distinguished between the accusations "fascist" (an unverifiable opinion) and "member of
Communist Party" (a precise fact). Somewhat baffling here is that the "sting" of the
accusation is that the plaintiff held particular political views. An undercover FBI agent,
now revealed to the light of day, would be more defamed by the accusation that he once
held fascist political views than by the accusation that he was once a member of the
Communist party.
54. See, eg., Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 1, at 1029-31 (arguing that bright-
line verifiablity test best comports with first amendment); Note, Need for a Bright-Line
Rule, supra note 1, at 1854 ("essential that courts develop a bright-line test"); Note,
Evolution of a Privilege, supra note 1, at 127 ("[s]pecific rules need to be formulated");
Note, Defamation, supra note 1, at 368 ("some methodology must be devised"); Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 320 (suggests that specific charges of criminal conduct be presumed
factual); Casenote, supra note 1, at 717 (urging Supreme Court to formulate specific
rules).
55. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("Since opinions cannot be false, they cannot be the basis of a defamation action."), va-
cated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1309
(10th Cir. 1983) (statement that doctors had "theory to which they were willing to sacri-
fice a child's life" was unverifiable, therefore an opinion); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982) (since it is physically impossible for fellatio to cause
levitation, statement alleging such events cannot be defamatory fact), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) ("assertion
that cannot be proved false cannot be held libellous"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977);
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 894 (2d Cir. 1976) (statements "so debatable, loose and
varying, that they are insusceptible to proof of truth or falsity"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
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false is automatically considered factual, while statements of more ques-
tionable verifiability are routinely placed in the opinion category.
This approach has some Supreme Court authority behind it, since the
Gertz dictum specifically contrasted opinions with "false statements of
fact." 6 Greenbelt and Letter Carriers, however, made no reference to
verifiability. What mattered was not whether a statement was verifiable
in the abstract, but how a reasonable reader would interpret the state-
ment in the particular context of the case. Asking whether a disputed
statement is verifiable only begs the question of what it exactly means,
and for that the Court turned to context.
2. Undisclosed Defamatory Facts Test
Once they have found a statement to be opinion, many courts apply a
second, arguably unnecessary test to distinguish further between pro-
tected and unprotected opinions.57 According to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement
in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable
only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion."" This test requires consideration of whether the
opinion implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts.59 An
opinion is not actionable if it explicitly supplies the facts upon which it
was based, or those facts are sufficiently known to the reader that he or
she can make an independent evaluation. If, however, a reasonable
reader would infer that the author of the statement is privy to undis-
closed defamatory facts, then the statement could be actionable.'
This test has been applied inconsistently. Similar news reports about a
woman divorcing her maimed husband have been found to imply defam-
atory facts on one occasion, while not implying them on an'other.61 The
Seventh Circuit recently stated that "[e]very statement of opinion con-
tains or implies some proposition of fact, just as every statement of fact
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
57. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977).
59. See, eg., Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 453 (3d
Cir. 1987) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507,
509 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
60. See Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1985); Lauderback v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 741 F.2d 193, 195-96 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190
(1985); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1309 (10th Cir. 1983); Cianci v. New Times
Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,
913 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283,
289-90, 501 N.E.2d 550, 552-53, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903-04 (1986).
61. Compare Burns v. Denver Post, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 325, 326-27, 606 P.2d 1310,
1310-11 (1979) ("[s]he just couldn't live with a blind man" did not imply undisclosed
defamatory facts) with Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360
(Colo. 1983) (en bane) (statement that she "deserted" him since accident implied undis-
closed defamatory facts).
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has or implies an evaluative component."62 Yet the same court then ap-
plied an undisclosed facts test before-and instead of-deciding whether
the disputed statements were fact or opinion.63 It then held that the term
"racist" applied to an elementary school principal "is not actionable un-
less it implies the existence of undisclosed, defamatory facts.""
It is not clear why "racist" does not imply undisclosed facts, while
"alcoholic" (the example given by the Restatement)65 supposedly does.
The distinction between opinions that imply undisclosed facts and those
that do not only encapsulates all the problems of distinguishing between
fact and opinion. Indeed, the widespread consensus on the undisclosed
facts test has engendered almost no analysis to help make the necessary
distinctions.66
The Supreme Court did not explicitly mention the undisclosed defam-
atory facts test in Gertz, Greenbelt or Letter Carriers. The Gertz dictum
made no distinction between opinions implying undisclosed facts and
those that did not, but seemed to protect all statements of opinion.6 7
Greenbelt pointed out that the newspaper fully and accurately reported
the plaintiff's proposal, and thus could be said to have disclosed the facts
upon which the statement "blackmail" was based.6" But the major
thrust of the decision, that "blackmail" in these circumstances was "rhe-
torical hyperbole," did not logically rely on any distinction between dis-
closure and non-disclosure of facts. Letter Carriers also did not mention
an undisclosed facts test, but instead asked whether a reader would infer
a factual representation in that context.69
The major difficulty with the undisclosed facts test, however, is that it
limits context analysis to one particular factor. As Olmah reasoned, the
presence of disclosed facts is merely one aspect of context:
factors besides the disclosure of facts are relevant in determining
whether a statement implies factual allegations to the reasonable
reader.... In a word, disclosure of facts in the surrounding text is not
the only signal that hard facts cannot reasonably be inferred from a
statement.7°
Focusing solely on disclosure of facts unduly limits a court's inquiry into
62. Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1339 (1989); see also Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 559, 549 N.E.2d
129, 134, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 943 (1989) ("As a practical matter, it is hard to conceive that
any published statement could be wholly devoid of factual reference.").
63. See Stevens, 855 F.2d at 400-01.
64. Id. at 402.
65. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 illustration 3 (1977).
66. See Note, Need for a Bright-Line Rule, supra note 1, at 1830.
67. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Note, Statements of
Fact, supra note 1, at 1014.
68. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970).
69. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 286 (1974).
70. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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the context of disputed statements, and can cause the court to disregard
other relevant factors.
3. Totality of the Circumstances Test
Before the Olman decision, the Ninth Circuit formulated a test for
distinguishing opinion from actionable fact which also considered the
context of the disputed statement.71 Under this three-pronged "totality
of the circumstances" test the court looks to (1) "all the words used, not
merely a particular phrase or sentence," (2) "cautionary terms used by
the person publishing the statement," and (3) "all of the circumstances
surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the state-
ment is disseminated and the audience to which it is published."72 Ap-
plying this test, the Ninth Circuit often finds litigated statements to be
opinion.73
One commentator has argued that this test is inferior to the one devel-
oped in Olman.74 The primary difference seems to be the greater detail
and specificity of Olman. The "totality of the circumstances" test exam-
ines "all of the words," without offering any guidance about what exactly
is worth notice. Cautionary language, for example, "I think," receives
particular attention.75 Precision and verifiability are not specifically
mentioned, while context is generalized rather than subdivided as in
Olman. If the Olman test is vague and indefinite, the Ninth Circuit's
test is even more so.
71. See Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781,
783-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 784.
73. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (9th Cir.)
(in context of debate on pornography, abusive cartoon and captions concerning anti-por-
nography activist were protected opinion), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1989); Leidholdt v.
L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1988) (description in pornographic magazine of
plaintiff as "pus bloated walking sphincter" who is "sexually repressed" not statement of
fact), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877,
879-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (description of plaintiff as "Asshole of the Month" and "wacko"
not statements of fact), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1532 (1989); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d
507, 509 (9th Cir. 1987) (in political controversy, implausible identification of plaintiff
with fugitive Nazi war criminal with same name not statement of fact); Lewis v. Time,
Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (inference that lawyer with judgments against
him for fraud and malpractice is "shady practitioner" was protected opinion). But see
Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant's suggestive
linkage between his refusal to accept bribe from Scientologists and power failure of his
airplane could be factual allegation of murder attempt).
74. See Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 1, at 1015-21, 1045-46 (characterizing
Olman as a "verifiability test" superior to Ninth Circuit "totality of circumstances test").
75. See Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781,
784 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for
accusations of crime by simply using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I think.' ").
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
II. AMBIVALENCE OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. Ollman's Formulation of a Four-Factor Test
The most influential analysis of the fact-opinion distinction occurred
in the en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Olman v. Evans.76 The case involved the statements in a
newspaper column that Berteil Ollman, a professor of political science,
"'is an outspoken proponent of 'political Marxism' "and "'has no status
within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist.' ,77 The last
statement caused sharp divisions within the court.78
Judge Starr formulated a four-factor test to distinguish contitutionally
protected statements of opinion from actionable statements of fact.7 9
This test requires consideration of (1) the precision or ambiguity of the
statement, (2) its verifiability, (3) the literary context in which the state-
ment occurred, and (4) the "broader" social context in which it ap-
peared.80 The four factors easily fall into two sets: the first set seems to
examine the text of the statement in abstract isolation, while the second
set considers the context in which the statement was made.
1. Precision
Olman reasoned that courts must analyze "common usage" of the dis-
puted words in order to determine whether they have a "precise core of
meaning for which a consensus of understanding exists."81 In theory,
readers are less likely to interpret a statement as factual when it seems
indefinite or ambiguous.82 Thus, a statement that a judge was "incompe-
76. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
77. Id. at 972-73 (quoting Evans & Novak, The Marxist Professor's Intentions, Wash.
Post, May 4, 1978) (court's emphasis omitted).
78. The court issued seven opinions, including four dissents. Judge Starr's opinion is
discussed infra at notes 79 to 133 and accompanying text. Judge Bork's influential con-
curring opinion suggested that a "totality of the circumstances" test be applied, taking
into consideration the extent to which liability would burden freedom of speech or press.
See Olman, 750 F.2d at 997. Also concurring, Judge MacKinnon argued that the polit-
ical debate surrounding Oliman's nomination rendered the statement opinion. See id. at
1015.
Writing dissenting opinions were Chief Judge Robinson, and Judges Wald, Edwards
and Scalia. Chief Judge Robinson argued that a continuum stretched from fact to pure
opinion, with hybrid opinion in between. See id. at 1021-28. Classifying the "no status"
statement as hybrid opinion, he argued that such statements were not protected unless
they fully disclosed the facts upon which they are based. See id. at 1029-30. Judge Wald
argued that the "no status" statement was verifiable by means of a poll of Ollman's col-
legues. See id. at 1033. Judge Edwards agreed with much of Starr's opinion, but still
argued that Olman's status was a verifiable fact. See id. at 1035-36. Lastly, Judge Scalia
argued in a vigorous dissent that Judge Bork's concurrence involved a "constitutional
'evolution,' with very little reason and very uncertain effect" and that free speech and
press were already amply protected by existing doctrines. Id. at 1036.
79. See id. at 979.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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tent" was held to be ambiguous opinion, while a statement that the same
judge was "corrupt" was held an actionable fact."
Olman offered an accusation of crime as example of "a statement with
a well-defined meaning."84 According to the court, such accusations
"depend for their meaning upon social normative systems .... so com-
monly understood that the statements are seen by the reasonable reader
or hearer as implying highly damaging facts.""5 Remarkably, however,
Olman did not mention that the two Supreme Court cases upon which it
explicitly relies, Greenbelt and Letter Carriers, both involved supposed
accusations of crime-blackmail and treason. 6 Evidently, the factor of
"precision" involves more complexities than Ollman explicitly
admitted. 7
Olman did not explicitly state how this precision/ambiguity distinc-
tion should be made, but its practice was particularly revealing. The
court suggested "fascist" was an epithet with widely varying meanings,
and consequently too imprecise to be factual. 8 Then, in a footnote, the
Olman court observed "that if the term were applied in a history of Italy
83. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381-82, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1306-07, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950-51, cert denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
84. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (citing Cianci v.
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
85. Id.
86. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 268 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970).
For a discussion of the two cases, see supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
A more recent Supreme Court case, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48
(1988), also involved what the plaintiff construed as an accusation of criminal conduct-
that Falwell committed incest with his mother. The jury found against the plaintiff on
this defamation claim because the statements could not be reasonably understood as fac-
tual. See id. at 49. Although the case at the Supreme Court level only involved claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court began its analysis by discussing
Gertz and opinion. See id. at 50-51.
87. The notion of precision in relation to "common usage," is itself much more com-
plex than Oilman suggests. The "common usage" of a word derives from its repeated
appearance in certain contexts, together with a reasonable reader's expectation that it will
continue to appear in similar contexts. Those reasonable expectations also vary both
between different communities and within a particular community. "Definitions are not
unanimously accepted. Each one represents only a consensus, and the strength of the
consensus varies from word to word. Imposition of the majority consensus necessarily
would restrict the speech of those not sharing the consensus." Schauer, Language, Truth,
and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 Va. L. Rev. 263,
282-83 (1978). Often the meaning of a word changes because it is transferred from one
context to another, for example, from a literal use to a figurative use. "The distortion of
language to emphasize a point-to express or to elicit an emotion-is present in varying
degrees in virtually all human dialogue.... There is no concrete line between the meta-
phor and the 'proper' use of words." Id. at 285.
88. The court briefly rehearsed the facts of Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977), where the Second Circuit found that "fas-
cist" was used with widely varying meanings in both a book and "the realm of political
debate." In short, "fascist" was imprecise in that context.
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between the World Wars," it would be defamatory.89 In short, "fascist"
might be precise in another context.
Effectively Olman's first factor, the precision of a statement, has col-
lapsed into context. Whether a statement is precise or imprecise depends
not upon an abstract "common usage" or "core of meaning" of the
words, but upon the situation in which the words were used. When a
court relies on the short cut of "common usage," it can leave the defend-
ant "convicted more by the dictionary than by the law."90 In order to
explain how its first factor works, the Olman court itself ultimately
turned to context.
2. Verifiability
Olman also reasoned that courts should consider whether disputed
statements are verifiable, or capable of being proved, asserting that a rea-
sonable reader would not interpret an unverifiable statement as factual. 91
Again, "fascist" was suggested as an unverifiable epithet.92 The panel
did not explicitly offer any methods for determining what is verifiable
and what is not, but it seemed optimistic about the prospects for courts
doing so: "Trial judges have rich experience in the ways and means of
proof and so will be particularly well situated to determine what can be
proven."93 Other courts have been much less sanguine, recognizing the
difficulty of drawing distinctions between verifiable and unverifiable
statements.94
Decisions purporting to apply Olman's four factors have divided over
whether allegations about motives are verifiable or not.9" Courts follow-
ing Olman have often held that allegations of criminal conduct are veri-
fiable,96 but many exceptions undercut the general rule.97 The Olman
89. Olman, 750 F.2d at 980 n.20 (citing Buckley, 539 F.2d at 893-94 n. 11).
90. Schauer, supra note 87, at 265.
91. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 981.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 982.
94. See, eg., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) ("no one can
separate the 'verifiable' from the 'non-verifiable' "), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989);
Schauer, supra note 87, at 276-81 (drawing distinction between verifiable factual truth
and unverifiable doctrinal truth, with large and difficult continuum in between); Post,
supra note 1, at 658 (distinguishing between factual statements that purport to be in-
dependent of particular perspective, and opinions that depend upon community institu-
tions and conventions for their validity).
95. Compare Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989)
(qualitative judgments about motivation unverifiable), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990)
and Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (allegation that sex education
teacher derives "secret" sexual gratification from teaching is unverifiable) with Potomac
Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1289 (4th Cir. 1987) ("em-
phatically" rejecting suggestion that statements about motives and intentions are
unverifiable).
96. See, e.g., Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1501-02 (D.D.C.
1987) (internal corporate report names plaintiff as responsible for fraudulent practices);
Vern Sims Ford, Inc. v. Hagel, 42 Wash. App. 675, 677, 683, 713 P.2d 736, 738, 741
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court was itself sharply divided over whether an allegation that a univer-
sity professor had "no status" in his profession was verifiable. Three
judges (including then Judge Scalia) joined in arguing that "Ollman's
scholarly reputation is adequately verifiable" by devising a poll of the
American Political Science Association.9" Judge Bork forcefully con-
tested such a suggestion, arguing that any poll would become engulfed in
disputes about the phrasing of questions, the representativeness of the
sample and the effect of the defendant's statements on the poll.99
Judge Starr's decision, by using "fascist" as an example of both impre-
cision and unveriflability, affirmed the close connection between the two
concepts. Before a court can decide whether a statement is verifiable, it
must first decide what it means. If" 'the sweet and sour pork contained
more dough (badly cooked) than meat'" actually means "the sweet and
sour pork was too doughy for my tastes," an abstractly verifiable state-
ment suddenly becomes unprovable."m Similarly, if" 'Fuller-Murderer
of Sacco and Vanzetti'" actually means "In my opinion, Governor
Fuller, although not legally responsible for the deaths of Sacco and Van-
zetti, is nonetheless morally responsible because he did not exercise his
power of pardon or commutation," an abstractly factual accusation turns
into a statement of opinion.101 "Only if taken literally can [the state-
ment] be deemed capable of being proved false." 102 Thus, Olman's sec-
ond factor, verifiability, effectively collapses into context along with the
first factor, precision.
3. Literary Context
Noting that readers are "inevitably" influenced by the literary context
in which a statement appears, the Olman plurality reasoned that courts
distinguishing fact from opinion must consider the article, column or
writing as a whole.10 3 One court following Olman listed a number of
considerations included in literary context: "cautionary or qualifying
(1986) (customer's protest that "Vern Sims Ford and Their Salesperson Bob Martin Are
Thieveslil" was defamatory fact), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1016 (1986).
97. See, e.g., Price, 881 F.2d at 1438 (supposed allegation that plaintiff suborned per-
jury was opinion); Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d
1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (with untested law, allegation of illegality not verifiable
outside of court); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463, 466 (D.N.H. 1987) (supposed
allegation of illegal drug use was opinion); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 254,
496 N.E.2d 699, 708-09 (1986) (sportswriter's allegation of perjury was opinion).
98. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wald, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
99. See id. at 1006 (Bork, J., concurring).
100. See Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 221, 228 (2d Cir. 1985)
(initial statement quoted from English translation of French Gault/Millau Guide to New
York (1981)).
101. See Schauer, supra note 87, at 263-65 (initial statement quoted from placard
message litigated in Commonwealth v. Cantor, 269 Mass. 359, 168 N.E. 790 (1929)).
102. Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 229.
103. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985).
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
language, language or style which signifies opinion, the type of publica-
tion, the location of the statement or work within the publication, and
the intended audience." 1" Generally, literary context includes not only
the language and medium in which the statement appeared, but also
what that language and medium signifies about the author's intentions
and the reasonable audience's expectations.
Thus, a statement that the plaintiff sex educator "'derives probably a
very secret sort of sexual gratification'" from enlightening her students
on "'homosexuality and perversion'" would be discounted by a reason-
able listener to the "Christian Family" radio call-in program in which it
appeared.105 The reasonable listener, given the radio call-in format, the
hypothetical intentions of the participants, and the expected audience,
would not anticipate any statements of fact.
Literary context can powerfully reshape statements that might, ab-
stractly considered, appear "obviously" precise and verifiable. For exam-
ple, the statement that plaintiff was" 'the only newscaster in town who is
enrolled in a course for remedial speaking,' "106 would seem easily verifi-
able. In an article on the best and worst sports personalities, complete
with cartoons and numerous "one-liners," the statement was held not to
be factual. 10
7
Decisions adopting the Olman rationale have found many specific lit-
erary genres to signal opinion: editorials and newspaper columns,108 let-
ters to editors,10 9 humorous and satirical articles,110 restaurant
reviews,11  campaign press releases,1 12 sports columns, 3 and "first per-
104. Price v. Viking Penguin, 881 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 757 (1990).
105. Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 302-04 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting from Encounter,
radio broadcast, Mar. 1, 1984).
106. Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 338, 403 N.E.2d 376, 377 (1980)
(quoting Best & Worst: Sports, Boston Magazine, Sept. 1976, at 71).
107. See Myers, 380 Mass. at 341-43, 403 N.E.2d at 379-80.
108. See, eg., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1290, 1300(D.C. Cir.) (newspaper column accused plaintiff organization of anti-semiticism and in-
flammatory trial tactics), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988).
109. See, ag., Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 558, 549 N.E.2d 129,
134, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 943 (1989) (Journal of Medical Primatology letter); Epstein v.
Trustees of Dowling College, 152 A.D.2d 534, 543 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (2d Dep't 1989)(letters in student newspaper criticized professor).
110. See, e.g., Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (1st Cir.) (in
magazine selection of humorous stories from newspapers "amazon" does not mean "sex-
ually aggressive and insatiable female who uses a mechanical device for her gratifica-
tion"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463, 465(D.N.H. 1987) (satiric article in magazine described politico as "a fat version of Dustin
Hoffman's 'Ratso' in Midnight Cowboy" who might be responsible for "a mickie in the
Canadian Club").
111. See, e.g., Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur, S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 227-29 (2d Cir. 1985)(acerbic restaurant review); cf. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 888-89 (La. 1977)(pre-Ollman case holding that review suggesting that dinners be entitled "trout a la green
plague" and "yellow death on duck" was opinion).
112. See, e.g., Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir.) (defendant politician
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son" narratives in newspapers. 114 But creating a list of literary genres
explicitly labelled "opinion" limits the flexibility inherent in Ollman." 5
At its most powerful, the test focuses on a particular statement in a par-
ticular context, because a reasonable reader is affected by both the gen-
eral literary genre and the particular characteristics of the
communication under discussion. Understood in this way, the Olman
test reveals that even a television broadcast of "hard news" can be
opinion.' 1 6
4. Social Context
When discussing "social context," Olman initially seemed to focus on
the social expectations surrounding a particular genre of writing or
speaking.' 17 But in practice, courts following Olman have looked not
only to expectations about a particular genre, but to the reasonable ex-
pectations of anyone confronted with a contentious social or political
dispute.' 18
Social context, therefore, includes a consideration of the public contro-
versy, if any, in which the statement was made and the plaintiff's status
as a public or private person. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc. 19 followed
just such a model. Given the political controversy over events on the
Indian reservation and the conduct of government agents, as well as
plaintiff's status as a public person deeply involved in those events, any
reasonable reader would expect statements of opinion. 2 '
questioned propriety of military man on active duty working for opposing campaign),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989).
113. See, e.g., Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 357, 359-60 (D. Colo.
1987) ("sleaze-bag agent" who "slimed up from the bayou" not statement of fact), aff'd
men., 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1989); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 251, 496
N.E.2d 699, 706-07 (1986) ("knows in his heart that [plaintiffs] lied" not a statement of
fact).
114. See, e.g., McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1987) (described condo-
minium project as "scam").
115. For a contrary position, see Note, Need for a Bright-Line Rule, supra note 1, at
1851, where the author advocates that the news media actually label certain articles as
"opinion," with an absolute privilege for any statement so labelled. "Conversely, any
column appearing without the opinion label would be treated as a statement of fact." Id.
The author does not discuss the easily foreseeable consequences of such a policy-that an
entire newspaper or news broadcast will come with an "opinion" label and courts will
then have to decide which labels are mere pretense.
116. See Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d 1010,
1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
117. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("Some types
of writing or speech by custom or convention signal to readers or listeners that what is
being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
118. As the court in Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990), reasoned, "[s]tatements made in the course of a political
debate are ... more likely to be understood as opinion." Id. at 1433.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1437-38; see also Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 877 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (given context of political controversy over
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As with literary context, categories of social context signalling opinion
could be distinguished: political controversies,12 1 union disputes, 122
sports controversies, 123 business competition, 124 charged debates on top-
ics of social controversy,1 25 and even a scientific controversy between a
hepatitis researcher and the chairwoman of the International Primate
Protection League over the use of chimpanzees in medical experimenta-
tion.12 6 But such a compilation of categories could be both endless and
pointless, because controversial topics are not limited to any particular
category. The operative question is whether a reasonable reader would
expect statements of opinion in this particular social context.
B. Ollman's Application of the Four Factors
Olman refused to state explicitly how to weigh these factors, although
their relative weight certainly influences the fact-opinion distinction.12 7
Judge Starr listed the precision and verifiability factors first, perhaps
seeming to accord them greater weight. Yet the Olman court opened its
own analysis with the contextual factors. 128
Olman began by mentioning the nation's history of pamphleteering on
political and social issues and the expectations of a reasonable reader
when confronted with a column on the Op-Ed page of a newspaper. 129
The "traditional function" of newspaper columns and the text of this
particular column were found to "predispose the average reader to re-
gard what is found there to be opinion."1 31 In such a context, the allega-
Boland Amendment and plaintiff's place in that controversy, allegation of illegality could
only be taken as opinion).
121. See, e.g., Southern Air Transp., 877 F.2d at 1016 (debate on aid to Nicaraguan
contras); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir.) (senatorial campaign), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (8th
Cir.) (political disputes and controversial criminal prosecutions on an Indian reserva-
tion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463, 468 (D.N.H.
1987) (political primary).
122. See Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 287-88, 501 N.E.2d 550, 551, 508
N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (1986) (tape recorded telephone message describes plaintiff as "scab,"
with additional insults).
123. See Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 359 (D. Colo. 1987) (foot-
ball coach referred to player's agent as "sleaze bag"), aff'd mem., 876 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.
1989).
124. See Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1290
(4th Cir. 1987) (businessmen discount views of one competitor about his rival's product).
125. See, e.g., Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304 (8th Cir. 1988) (sex education in the
schools); Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1st Cir.) (social debate
about gender roles), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988).
126. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 553-54, 559, 549 N.E.2d
129, 130-31, 134, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939-40, 943 (1989).
127. See Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980, n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
128. See id. at 986.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 987.
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tions that Olman was a "political Marxist" were easily held to be
imprecise and unverifiable opinion.
The decision then turned to what it considered "the most troublesome
statement," the claim that Ollman had no status in his profession.13 1 Re-
markably, all discussion of the precision or verifiability of this "no sta-
tus" allegation was relegated to the footnotes. 132  By so doing, the
Olman court demonstrated that literary and social context are not
merely two of the factors involved, but the determining influences.1 33 In
practice, Ollman makes context crucial and even dispositive, whether it
explicitly says so or not.
C. Divergent Applications of the Ollman Test
Two approaches, both relying on Olman, disagree about the relative
emphasis that should be granted to the first set of factors (precision and
verifiability) or to the second set (literary and social context). Courts
stressing precision and verifiability tend to examine the statement for
these factors first, and then turn to context as a possible exculpatory fac-
tor. 134 Conversely, courts that treat context as formative rarely make an
initial finding of factuality. Instead, they emphasize the literary and so-
cial setting, and often declare the statement an opinion despite its ab-
stract precision or verifiability. 135
1. Context as Formative and Essential
In effect, Ollman treated context as a formative influence that deserves
131. See id. at 989.
132. See id. at 990 n.42. Also see Judge Bork's concurrence, which details the
problems of conducting a poll of Ollman's colleagues, from determining exactly who they
are, to phrasing the questions, to interpreting the results. Id. at 1006-07 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
133. "The identical quotation in [another context] would, of course, be quite another
matter." Id. at 990.
134. See Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1989); Poto-
mac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1288-89 (4th Cir.
1987); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1129-30 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
An extreme example of this approach is Capan v. Daugherty, 402 N.W.2d 561 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987), where defendant, a member of the municipal government, stated that a
recently fired city employee was not " 'dealing with a full. deck.'" Id. at 562. "'Maybe
the girl is frustrated. Maybe she has mental problems.' [Defendant] pointed out that he
is a lifelong resident of Minneapolis and is happily married, whereas [plaintiff] is neither."
Id. at 562-63 (quoting Karen Capan: Was She Fired for Political Reasons? Minneapolis
Tribune, May 12, 1979, at 4B, col. 2). The court explicitly stated that this was a specific
and verifiable allegation that the plaintiff lacked mental competence. Only the context of
cautionary language, an adversarial relationship, and local politics immunized it as opin-
ion. See id. at 563-64.
135. See Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431-34 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
877 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1248-51 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d
548, 557, 549 N.E.2d 129, 133, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942 (1989).
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primary consideration.' 36 Courts following this approach consider the
issues of precision and verifiability within a particular context.137 "Judg-
ments about context often determine a statement's proper classifica-
tion." 3 Literary context signals a reasonable reader to expect either
opinion or fact, and social context shapes the ways in which statements
are understood. 13 9
Only within such a framework can the precision and verifiability of a
statement be determined. In isolation, a statement might seem to display
a precision and verifiability that it does not possess in context. "Ulti-
mately, we must decide-not whether a statement in isolation is by virtue
of its phrasing factual-but rather whether, when taken in context, the
statement functions and would be understood as an unqualified assertion
of fact rather than as an element of an opinion.""
This emphasis on context not only aids a court when it interprets a
disputed statement, but also guarantees that libel liability does not chill
the robust debate on public issues encouraged by the first amendment.
"Where core values of the first amendment are implicated, even some
false statements of fact must be protected."14 ' If statements made during
a public debate on a controversial topic are more likely to be understood
as opinion,"' recognizing that reasonable expectation ensures that a bor-
derline statement of opinion is not actionable as a false statement of
fact. 143
The reach of this argument becomes apparent when allegations of
criminal conduct are considered. An accusation of illegality would seem
on its face to be clearly verifiable.'" Emphasizing context, however,
courts have occasionally found such allegations to be no more than ex-
136. See infra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
137. See Prce, 881 F.2d at 1432; Secrist 874 F.2d at 1248-50; Southern Air Transp.,
877 F.2d at 1016-17.
138. Price, 881 F.2d at 1433.
139. See id. at 1432-33.
140. Id. at 1432 (citing Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(Bork, J., concurring)). The court concluded that context must be paramount: "We
must therefore always ultimately focus on the context from which both the dispute and
the statements arise, remaining sensitive to our republic's interest in robust debate and
the protection of unpopular viewpoints." Id. at 1433.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (first
amendment presupposes "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well in-
clude vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir.) ("While political
commentators often decry the 'low level' of campaign tactics or rhetoric, the debate
which accompanies public examination of candidates for public office lies at the heart of
the First Amendment and is essential to our democratic form of government."), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 324 (1989).
144. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985); cf. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 382,
366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 951 ("Accusations of criminal activity, even in
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pressions of opinion. 145 One litigated statement, for example, seemed in
the abstract to accuse an FBI agent of criminal subornation of perjury:
"'More serious than [the witness's] lies was the all but inescapable con-
clusion that [plaintiff] had knowingly prepared this [witness] to give false
testimony; at the very least, [plaintiff] found his story so convenient that
[plaintiff] had not bothered to find out if it was true.' "146
Given the social and literary context,14 this seemingly "specific and
verifiable" allegation that the plaintiff had "not bothered" to investigate
was actually "a qualitative judgment about the agency's motivation, ef-
fort and effectiveness."14 According to the court, the suggestion that the
plaintiff had suborned perjury, embedded in the context of frank opinion
about governmental actions, would also be interpreted as opinion. 149 An
abstractly verifiable accusation was thus revealed to be unverifiable
opinion. 150
2. Context as Extrinsic and Circumstantial
Olman listed precision and verifiability first, perhaps seeming to grant
them greater emphasis. 51 One approach derived from Olman stresses
the form of an opinion, are not constitutionally protected."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
145. See, eg., Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d
1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (suggestion that plaintiff participated in "illegal opera-
tion" was opinion, given untested reach of Boland amendments); Secrist, 874 F.2d at
1249-51 (suggestion that military officer violated Hatch Act by soliciting funds for a
political campaign was opinion); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250-54, 496
N.E.2d 699, 705-09 (1986) (suggestion that plaintiff committed perjury was statement of
opinion).
146. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1438 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting P.
Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 98 (1982)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
147. The court made explicit the context of legal and political controversy surrounding
the trial and the government's conduct, as well as the conflict between the FBI and the
American Indian Movement. See id. at 1434-35. The author's preparation and his sym-
pathies were outlined, see id. at 1435-37, and the court discussed the plaintiff's role in the
controversial events. See id. at 1431.
The original perjury had been egregious, crowned by the revelation that the witness
"had been in California appearing on television and at college campuses" during some of
the events he claimed to witness in South Dakota. Id. at 1437. The court before which
the perjury occurred dismissed the case for government misconduct, id. at 1435, and
sharply criticized the FBI investigation as "consist[ing] of giving [the witness] liquor,
putting him up at plush resorts and overcompensating him for his short service as a
witness in the amount of $2,074.50." Id. at 1439 (citing the trial transcript at the time of
the original perjury). For a discussion of the resulting news accounts, editorials, and
books, see id. at 1431. Members of Congress also expressed concern. See id.
148. Id. at 1438.
149. See id.
150. In the words of the Eighth Circuit, "[t]he entire discussion in context is a consid-
eration of possibilities and likelihoods with respect to [the witness's] testimony. The au-
thor concludes with the opinion that the only certainty is that the episode discredited the
prosecution." Id.
151. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cerL denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985). However Olman actually began its analysis by examining context.
See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
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these two factors, treating literary and social contexts as circumstantial
considerations which possibly exculpate statements otherwise factual. 1 2
According to this view, words possess an abstract meaning, independ-
ent of context, and that abstract meaning can be characterized with de-
grees of precision and verifiability. Social context and literary context
are seen as extrinsic to the disputed statement, and only circumstantially
affect its intrinsic meaning.153 If the intrinsic meaning is sufficiently pre-
cise and verifiable, a context of social controversy and opinion format
have negligible effect.
For example, a reasonable television viewer might expect opinion
when interpreting statements made during the "Perspective" segment of
a newscast, particularly allegations that a cigarette company aimed its
advertising strategy at young people and associated smoking with the
"'illicit pleasure[s]'" of the adult world, such as "'wine, beer, shaving,
or wearing a bra.' "54 However, by emphasizing abstract specificity,"'5 a
decision reasoned that "[t]he critical passages of the Perspective are with-
out question factual under the first two Olman factors. The only issue is
whether the quoted statement is true or false." '156
The decision ignored the formative character that Olman implicitly
grants to context. Instead, context was treated as merely an exculpatory
factor that may or may not "immunize" statements on certain occa-
sions. 157 The court effectively found irrelevant the tone of the comments,
the use of the "Perspective" format, and the context of public debate
about cigarette smoking.1 58
III. CONTEXT MUST RECEIVE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION
When distinguishing actionable statements of fact from constitution-
ally protected opinion, courts should emphasize context, taking into ac-
count the formative effect that it has upon the meaning of a statement.
Indeed, without explicitly examining the context or implicitly assuming
one, the meaning of a disputed statement could not be interpreted at all.
Minimizing the importance of context and effectively separating fact
152. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1129-30 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). The Seventh Circuit's use of Ollman was
grudging, and it explicitly noted that it used the four-factor test only at the request of the
parties. Id. at 1129 n.3.
153. For example, the court in Brown & Williamson Tobacco reasons "[t]he fact that a
report is delivered in a caustic tone does not turn a statement of fact into a statement of
opinion." Id. at 1131. The tone of a statement thus becomes an external feature which
fails to effect the statements predetermined meaning.
154. Id. at 1123 (quoting Walter Jacobson's Perspective (WBBM-TV broadcast, Nov.
11, 1981)). The anchorman then concluded "'t]hey're not slicksters. They're liars.'"
Id.
155. "[T]his case involves some very specific statements against a very specific com-
pany in the tobacco industry." Id. at 1122.
156. Id. at 1130.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1130-31.
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from opinion by a de facto bright-line rule risks underprotecting speech
and confining opinion into a conceptual strait-jacket.
A. Hermeneutic Arguments for the Importance of Context
Linguists and philosophers of language have frequently stressed the
formative power of context in determining the meaning of individual
words and sentences.159 Justice Holmes pointed out the chameleon-like
quality of individual words in various contexts: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used."" Although the comment is redolent of the
biological view of language common in the nineteenth century, 161 it does
emphasize that context determines and delimits the meaning assigned to
statements by a reasonable reader.
Despite the great weight it gives context, Olman offered an example of
an abstract factual statement: "Mr. Jones had ten drinks at his office
party and sideswiped two vehicles on his way home."1 62 The court sug-
gested it would be "rather hard" to view this as opinion.1 61 Yet viewing
the statement as fact requires a number of contextual assumptions. The
reader assumes that "ten drinks" is a verifiable amount of alcohol, not
ten sips of water, and that the two "vehicles" were automobiles, not the-
atrical performances. The reader also presumes that the statement was
not made by a comedian at a celebrity roast of a notorious teetotaler. 164
That these assumptions about context are "normal" does not render
them any less hypothetical.
Olman's exemplary statement, like any other, carries a particular
159. See, e.g., R. Palmer, Hermeneutics 87 (1969) ("A whole sentence, for instance, is
a unity. We understand the meaning of an individual word by seeing it in reference to the
whole of the sentence; and reciprocally, the sentence's meaning as a whole is dependent
on the meaning of individual words."); H. Gadamer, Truth and Method 258-59 (1975)
("we must understand the whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the
whole.... We learn that we must 'construe' a sentence before we attempt to understand
the individual parts of the sentence in their linguistic meaning. But this process of con-
struing is itself already governed by an expectation of meaning that follows from the
context of what has gone before."); J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 139 (2d ed.
1978) ("what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a
speech situation") (emphasis in original).
On the multifold purposes which words and sentences can serve, see L. Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations 11 (3d ed. 1958) ("how many kinds of sentences are there?
Say assertion, question, and command?-There are countless kinds: countless different
kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not
something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we
may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete." (emphasis in original)).
160. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
161. See G. Sampson, Schools of Linguistics 17 (1980).
162. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
163. See id.
164. The "ordinary meaning of words" is completely undercut when the context sug-
gests irony. "Ollie is an honorable man" means the opposite in a comedian's monologue.
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"factual" meaning only in certain contexts and because of certain social
conventions. A sign reading "PRIVATE MEMBERS ONLY" has one
meaning in its "normal" context, on the door of a private club, while it
might have other meanings in the vagaries of classroom discussion.1
65
The statement "Our mothers bore us" has different meanings depending
on whether the conversation dealt with birth or boredom. 166 Similarly, a
sign reading "NO LITTERING" has a different meaning on a public
beach and on the wall of a birth control clinic.
These various meanings are not the rare creatures of a limited preserve
of "ambiguous" language. Rather they clarify the way in which context
shapes a reader's interpretation of particular words. Even a statement as
facially "obvious" as "I will go" can be interpreted as a threat, a warn-
ing, a promise, a statement of intent and so on depending upon the con-
text in which it appears. 167 "Dr. Jones is a murderer" seems abstractly
factual, until placed on an anti-abortion placard outside the doctor's
house. 168 To decide that the statement is factual outside its context only
assumes unconsciously that it appeared in a "normal" context. "But
what is normal (like what is ordinary, literal, everyday) is a function of
circumstances in that it depends on the expectations and assumptions
that happen to be in force." 169
Because context shapes the meaning of individual words and
sentences, it also influences their degree of precision or ambiguity. 70 In
165. S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 275 (1980).
166. See W. Quine, Word and Object 129 (1960).
167. See S. Fish, supra note 165, at 284.
168. See R. Smolla, supra note 15, at 60. The protester's statement might be analyzed
as two simultaneous statements: "Dr. Jones is an abortionist," an undisputed fact, and
"Abortionists are murderers," a privileged opinion. But this analysis is itself possible
only because context alerts the reasonable reader that two intertwined statements are
being made simultaneously.
The reasonable reader must also know when to stop this dissection. "Dr. Jones is an
abortionist" perhaps separates into "Dr. Jones has counseled women to have abortions,"
a supposed statement of fact, and "Anyone who counsels abortions is an abortionist," a
supposed statement of opinion. "Dr. Jones has counseled women to have abortions" can
then be analyzed as "Dr. Jones has discussed positively the arguments for abortion with
women facing the decision," a supposed statement of fact, and "Anyone who discusses
arguments for abortion positively has counseled abortion," a statement of opinion. Anal-
ysis of sentence meaning can always be carried to another level, revealing yet more shades
of fact and opinion.
Professor Smolla's hypothetical was soon followed by an actual case on similar facts,
Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (1988), appeal denied, 124 Ill.
2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 922 (1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3217 (1989). Defendant abortion
protestor displayed a poster with the name and picture of plaintiff, the director of an
abortion clinic, stating that she was "Wanted" for "killing the unwanted and unpro-
tected." Id. at 537, 527 N.E.2d at 1014. The court noted that the statement, abstractly
considered, was a "potentially damaging fact." Id. In this social context, however, the
statement was protected opinion. See id.
169. S. Fish, supra note 165, at 287 (emphasis in original).
170. See, e.g., W. Quine, supra note 166, at 128 (on precision/vagueness of "Mount
Rainer," depending on whether the statement involves height or area); L. Wittgenstein,
supra note 159, at 32-34, 41 (on "family resemblances" and "exactness").
[Vol. 58
CONTEXT IN DEFAMATION
an example frequently used in speech act theory, the statement "France
is hexagonal" might be "good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps,
but not for a geographer."'71 Whether a statement is precise or not de-
pends on the purposes for which it is intended. As Olman noted, "fas-
cist" is more precise in one context for one purpose (a historical work on
pre-war Italy) and less precise in another context and with another pur-
pose (a polemic between a political commentator and his critics).' Ab-
stracted from context, "fascist" cannot be said to have any degree of
precision at all. In order to judge the precision of a statement, context
and purpose must be examined.
Similarly, whether a statement is verifiable or not depends upon the
context in which it appears and the purpose for which it is formulated. 7 '
Even scientific statements are verifiable because of the context of shared
assumptions, the paradigm, in which the statement appears. 174 Courts,
however, must weigh the verifiability not of scientific statements, but of
statements like "'Little Amazons Attack Boys.' "T175 To adjudge these
statements verifiable, a court must first determine what they mean, an
inquiry that leads inevitably towards social and literary context.
B. Policy Considerations
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the significance of constitutional pro-
tection for opinion in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,'76 which empha-
sized "the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions
on matters of public interest and concern."'17 7 The Court then cited the
Gertz dictum approvingly, with the gloss "[w]e have therefore been par-
ticularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain
free from governmentally imposed sanctions."'' 7
8
Numerous rationales have been offered to justify the first amendment's
dictate, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ,,179 As formulated by one scholar, four
171. J. Austin, supra note 159, at 143.
172. See Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
173. See Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1988) ("2 + 3 = 5" is
verifiable statement in context where "+ signifies addition, in base six or higher), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989).
174. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 10-22 (1970) (on paradigms
in "normal science").
175. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1014 (1st Cir.) (quoting Hard
Times, Penthouse, Apr. 1986, at 144), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988).
176. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
177. Id. at 50.
178. Id. at 51; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 503-04 (1984) (stating that "the freedom to speak one's mind" is "essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole" and quoting the Gertz
dictum); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) (constitutional distinction
between fact and opinion justified by cost of condemning speech that turns out harmless
or socially useful), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1339 (1989).
179. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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primary motivations underlie the speech and press clauses of the first
amendment: (1) free expression assures individual self-fulfillment; (2)
free discussion advances knowledge and aids the discovery of truth; (3)
free speech is required for the participation of all citizens in decision-
making; and (4) free expression leads towards "a more adaptable and
hence a more stable community," which "maintain[s] the precarious bal-
ance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."18 Each of
these rationales leads to a presumption for wide protection of statements
of opinion, and suggests that statements should be carefully considered in
context before they are held to be actionable fact.
Although courts often commend free expression of opinion for its so-
cial benefits, the Supreme Court has also stated that "the freedom to
speak one's mind" is "a good unto itself." '181 Thus the typical defama-
tion suit involves not only the plaintiff's interest in his or her reputation
and society's interest in free expression, but also the defendant's right to
individual expression. That alone should encourage courts to make cer-
tain that the disputed statement was actually understood by the commu-
nity as a defamatory statement of fact, not merely a personal expression
of dislike.
The second rationale, that the search for knowledge and truth is ad-
vanced by free discussion, is perhaps the most widely encountered. This
"marketplace of ideas" argument derives in part from Justice Holmes'
famed dissent in Abrams v. United States,"s2 where he argued that "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." '183 Given the fallibility of both the individ-
180. T. Emerson, supra note 1, at 6-7.
181. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984);
see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("the
final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties") (overruled by
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)); T. Emerson, Towards a General Theory
of the First Amendment 5 (1966) ("every man-in the development of his own personal-
ity-has the right to form his own beliefs and opinions. And it also follows that he has
the right to express these beliefs and opinions. Otherwise they are of little account.");
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 991(1978) ("To justify legal obligation, the community must respect individuals as equal,
rational and autonomous moral beings."); Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A
Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 54, 80 (1989) (free
expression allows development of individual's rational faculties and creative impulses).
But see F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry 64-65 (1982) (arguing that
speech cannot claim special status over other activities as self-realizing and self-
expressive).
182. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
183. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth"). See gener-
ally, L. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society 43-75 (1986) (on the classical model justifying
free speech); F. Schauer, supra note 181, at 15-34 (praises marketplace theory for the
scepticism it encourages towards our own opinions, but wonders about the assumption
that truth and reason will prevail in the end); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 Duke L.J. I (arguing that marketplace theory is implausible in mod-
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ual and the government, free discussion provides the soundest method of
arriving at socially valuable opinions. 18 4 Although some or even most
opinions are socially valueless, free debate is trusted to sort them out.
Even "wrong" or socially useless opinions have some value because their
very wrongness can strengthen one's awareness of more socially benefi-
cial opinions."15 In this "marketplace of ideas," an opinion deserves con-
stitutional protection even when preposterous, unpleasant and clearly
offensive to community standards." 6
The third rationale, that free expression is required for democratic self-
government, has been forcefully argued by philosopher Alexander
Meiklejohn.1 17 In order to make informed and responsible decisions, cit-
em society and only legitimizes entrenched power structures); Schauer, supra note 88, at
268-72 (briefly criticizing marketplace theory of free speech).
The "marketplace of ideas" rationale for free speech is not without its detractors, who
often argue that it presupposes an overly optimistic view of human nature. Truth may
emerge victorious in the "long run," but error too frequently commands the present day.
Justice Brandeis argued in Whitney that "discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine," 274 U.S. at 375, to which one critic
responded "we have lived through too much to believe it." A. Bickel, Morality of Con-
sent 71 (1975).
184. See Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966, 969 (1980) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) ("the press is free to differ with judicial determinations.
In the libel area, neither a court nor any other institution is the 'recognized arbiter of
truth'. . .") (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1979)).
185. See John Stuart Mill's well-known argument:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing
the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation-those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impres-
sion of truth produced by its collision with error.
J.S. Mill, On Liberty 21 (C. Shields ed. 1956). See also Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881
F.2d 1426, 1446 (8th Cir. 1989) ("there is a larger injury to be considered, the damage
done to every American when a book is pulled from a shelf, as in this case, or when an
idea is not circulated"), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
186. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592-93 (1969).
187. See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948), re-
printed in A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People
(1960). The discussion of Meiklejohn's position has been extensive. See generally L. Bol-
linger, supra note 183, at 151-52 (criticizing Meiklejohn for ignoring speech restrictions
produced by democratic process, or restrictions against speech that undermines self-gov-
ernment); H. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition 67 (1988) (New York Times "almost literally
incorporated" Meiklejohn's arguments); F. Schauer, supra note 181, at 37-46 (pointing
out the distance between Meiklejohn's town meeting model and modern society, and
questioning whether his position allows majority tyranny); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 26-28 (1971) (takes Meiklejohn's posi-
tion further than Meiklejohn himself and argues that the first amendment protects only
explicitly political speech, not scientific, educational, commerical or literary speech);
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14-17 (1965) (discussing influence of Meiklejohn's argument upon the
Court in New York Times case); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the
"Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 209 (argues that
Meiklejohn's argument strongly influenced the Court); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
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izens must have access to all relevant information and viewpoints.
"What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said." ' That some of these opinions are empty,
acerbic, and even obscene does not render them socially valueless. In-
stead, by allowing such expressions of violent and abusive opinion, read-
ers and listeners can become aware of the unpleasant but symptomatic
feelings of others, "provid[ing] us with a social thermometer for register-
ing the presence of disease within the body politic."189
The last rationale, that free speech strengthens society itself, making it
both more stable and adaptable, has been further developed by Professor
Bollinger. 190 Free speech becomes a testing ground where society "exer-
cise[s] extraordinary self-restraint toward injurious behavior as a means
of symbolically demonstrating a capacity for self-control toward feelings
that necessarily must play a role throughout social interaction, but which
also have a tendency to get out of hand."' 1 Under this analysis, free
expression becomes not only a method of controlling intolerance, but
also a practical exercise to eliminate it. Seemingly valueless and even
harmful opinions are tolerated not only to protect more valued opinions,
but also to learn how to tolerate other, non-speech activities.
Against the community's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate,' 92 courts have long recognized the individual's interest in
his or her reputation.' 9 "However much as individuals we may try to
disconnect our own feelings about ourselves from the feelings that others
bear toward us, we are never more than partially successful."' x94 But as
the Gertz dictum recognized, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed, an indi-
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255-57 (first amendment protects freedom to share
in governmental decisions in all their diversity, expanding beyond narrowly political con-
cerns to education, science, philosophy, literature and public discussion of public issues);
Schauer, supra note 87, at 272-73 (suggests that Meiklejohn's position only protects infor-
mation transmitted, with principal purpose of changing minds).
188. A. Meiklejohn, supra note 187, at 21.
189. L. Bollinger, supra note 183, at 55.
190. See id. at 104-44.
191. Id. at 142-43. "[T]he purposes of the free speech enterprise may reasonably in-
clude not only the 'protection' of a category of especially worthy human activity but also
the choice to exercise extraordinary self-restraint toward behavior acknowledged to be
bad but that can evoke feelings that lead us to behave in ways we must learn to temper
and control." Id. at 120. Professor Bollinger's defense of free speech has somewhat elit-
ist aspects; the first amendment becomes the Supreme Court's excuse to send the Ameri-
can public unwillingly down the long and lonely road of self-improvement.
192. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
193. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (libel law protects
"'our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being,'" (quoting
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring))); Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A]n individual's interest in his or her reputation is
of the highest order. Its protection is an eloquent expression of the respect historically
afforded the dignity of the individual in Anglo-American legal culture."), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
194. L. Bollinger, supra note 183, at 65.
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vidual's reputation is harmed primarily by false statements of fact. 195
Courts encounter their greatest difficulties balancing these two oppos-
ing interests-the individual's interest in reputation and society's interest
in free debate-with disputed statements like those in Price v. Viking
Penguin, Inc. 196 The challenged statement itself, that plaintiff "know-
ingly prepared [a witness] to give false testimony," seems in the abstract
a precise and verifiable allegation of illegal conduct.197 But the literary
and social contexts, including qualitative judgments about the motiva-
tions and purposes of government actors involved in a contentious polit-
ical and legal dispute, suggest opinion. 1
98
When ruling on a statement that seems to fall within the broad contin-
uum between undisputed fact and undisputed opinion, a court faces two
dangers. If it errs by emphasizing abstract verifiability and holding the
statement to be factual, the court suppresses an opinion that might be
socially useful, and the very act of affixing liability could have a chilling
effect on other speech. If, however, the court errs by emphasizing con-
textual factors and the community's reasonable interpretation and holds
the statement opinion, it denies redress for an ambiguous statement with
indeterminate consequences. 199 Given the imperatives of the first amend-
ment and its protection for the expression of opinion, the danger of sup-
pressing speech is much larger and broader.
An emphasis on the reasonable reader's interpretation of a statement
in context is also particularly fitted to the harm caused by a defamatory
utterance. Because the interest protected by defamation law is by defini-
tion an individual's reputation in the community,2" the distinction be-
tween statements of fact and statements of opinion should be based upon
how a reasonable member of that community would construe the state-
ment.20 1 Such an interpretation involves not only abstract categories of
precision or verifiability, but also the source of the statement, its conjec-
tural purpose, the medium in which it appeared, the status of the person
to whom it referred, and the intensity of controversy-in short the multi-
195. See Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
196. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
197. Id. at 1438 (quoting P. Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 98 (1982)).
198. See id. at 1438-39.
199. Actual damages in defamation suits are notoriously difficult to quantify. In
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988), for example, the jury awarded a cigarette manufacturer $3
million in compensatory damages for a televised statement that it encouraged children to
smoke. See id. at 1139. The trial court reduced that award to $1.00, reasoning that the
plaintiff had not demonstrated any lost sales, lost profits, or lost customers. See id. The
Seventh Circuit, emphasizing the power of television, reversed the trial court and rein-
stated $1 million in compensatory damages. See id. at 1142. The court admitted, "We
recognize that this is a very inexact and somewhat arbitrary process." Id.
200. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
201. See supra notes 159-175 and accompanying text.
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ple and variable factors of context.2 °2
Many commentators have argued that speech can best be protected by
formulating a sharp, bright-line definition of opinion.203 But these at-
tempts to create de facto or de jure bright-line rules actually authorize
abstract and simplistic categories. Any single-factor or de facto bright-
line test would falsify the boundary between fact and opinion, and there-
fore underprotect speech by making some opinions actionable. Unno-
ticed, however, is the effect that such a bright-line rule would have on the
individual's interest in reputation. Making verifiability and precision the
talismanic indicators of "fact" would encourage and immunize unverifi-
able allegations. In contrast, by examining context and according it pri-
mary emphasis, courts continue the valuable first amendment tradition of
weighing the function and purpose of disputed statements.
C. Potential Criticisms of an Emphasis on Context
Olman's emphasis on context has produced dismay, consternation
and even hysteria among its critics.2' A test that explicitly stressed con-
text, and subordinated abstract precision and verifiability, could be ex-
pected to provoke similar criticisms. Two are particularly important.
First, it has been argued that emphasizing context is a revolutionary de-
parture from established practice.20 5 Secondly, it has been claimed that a
stress on context will lead to the dreaded result of a lawless lawmaker.20 6
202. For example, the court in Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990), examines the political and legal controversy
underlying the challenged statements, the plaintiff's position as a public figure deeply
involved in that controversy, the author's tone and sympathies, and his reliance on public
records. Id. at 1434-37.
203. See, e.g., Note, Statements of Fact, supra note 1, at 1055 (arguing that a ver-
ifiability test is most consistent with first amendment values); Note, Fact-Opinion Deter-
mination, supra note 1, at 840 (arguing that only explicit and specific charges should be
considered actionable fact); Note, Need for a Bright-Line Rule, supra note 1, at 1851
(arguing that the press should be encouraged to "label" articles either opinion or fact,
with any article not so labelled deemed to be fact); Comment, supra note 1, at 320 (argu-
ing that specific charges of criminal conduct should be presumed fact).
204. See, e.g., Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 276, 496 N.E.2d 699, 725
(1986) (Brown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("verbal orgy of nonsensicaljargon which cascades from the majority's discussion of the spurious four-factor test");
id. at 265 n.8, 496 N.E.2d at 717 n.8 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (comparing four-factor test to newspaper's daily horoscope).
205. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1038 (1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part) (criticizing a "creative approach to first amendment jurisprudence"), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 263, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (likening court's decision on article to a "Jekyll
and Hyde transformation"); id. at 274, 496 N.E.2d at 724 (Brown, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("smashing to smithereens their sacred doctrine of stare decisis").
206. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he result to be obtained through application of the Olman factors is in
the eye of the judge."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Olman, 750 F.2d at 1038
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (risk of judicial subjectivity); Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 267,
496 N.E.2d at 719 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("patently arbi-
trary, and too unreliable"); id. at 273, 496 N.E.2d at 723 (Brown, J., concurring in part,
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Yet these criticisms are unfounded. Courts, like all readers and listen-
ers, have long implicitly recognized the formative power of context upon
the meaning of statements. Even Justice Scalia, a stalwart dissenter in
Olman, relied upon context when contrasting the disputed statement in
Olman with a hypothetical example: "If [the defendants] had chosen to
call Ollman a traitor to our nation, fair enough. No reasonable person
would believe, in that context, that they really meant a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2381 (1982). ",207
Similarly, critics need not fear that free-wheeling judges will now begin
interpreting statements to mean whatever they want them to mean and
institute an Orwellian Big Brother regime.2 °8 Because statements are al-
ways read and interpreted in a particular context, a lawless situation of
"wild" interpretations is unlikely to occur. A truly idiosyncratic inter-
pretation20 9 will rarely arise in a judge's mind, because judges have al-
ready learned to interpret statements in a community-approved manner.
Yet, even were this "wild" interpretation to appear, the judge would soon
be enlightened, checked, and reversed by the community of other judges.
Even if this interpretation were to take hold of the mind of a Supreme
Court justice, there would still be the small community of eight other
justices to argue otherwise.
D. Operation of a Test Emphasizing Context
A test explicitly emphasizing context would neither overturn estab-
lished law nor make the court's task appreciably more difficult. This can
be shown by examining two decisions which held statements to be action-
able fact, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson,210 and Blue
Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc.21
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the Seventh Circuit considered a
newscast "Perspective" in which the defendant anchorman said of a ciga-
rette manufacturer, " 'They're not slicksters. They're liars.' "22 Consid-
ered in its social and literary context, this was not a statement of fact. It
appeared during a segment specifically labelled "Perspective," which
would lead the viewer to expect opinion. The anchorman's signature ap-
peared on the screen, while the anchorman delivered the statement in a
dissenting in part) ("so malleable and spongy as to permit any interpretation anyone
wishes"); Note, Defamation, supra note 1, at 369 ("elaborate ad hoe judgment call").
207. 750 F.2d at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added).
208. See, e.g., Scott, 25 Ohio St. 3d at 272 n.12, 496 N.E.2d at 723 n.12 (Brown, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (suggesting that under Olman "War is Peace,"
"Freedom is Slavery," and "Ignorance is Strength") (quoting G. Orwell, Nineteen
Eighty-Four (1949)).
209. For example, that "amazon" means "sexually aggressive and insatiable female
who uses a mechanical device for her gratification" as argued by the plaintiff in Fudge v.
Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988).
210. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
211. 866 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1989).
212. 827 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Walter Jacobson's Perspective (WBBM-TV broadcast,
Nov. 11, 1981)).
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"caustic tone," further reinforcing that this was a personal viewpoint.213
The court itself recognized the atmosphere of controversy over the to-
bacco industry.21 4 The statement also involved allegations of motive and
subliminal sexual messages in an advertisement that displayed a young
woman wading in a fountain, with the slogan "If it feels good, do it."'215
Given the medium, the subject-matter of the statement, and the public
controversy about the cigarette industry, a reasonable viewer would con-
strue the statement as opinion.
Blue Ridge Bank serves as a counter-example. The defendant was a
corporation in the business of gathering, processing and distributing fi-
nancial information about banks, credit unions, and savings associations
from such sources as the Federal Reserve Board.21 6 It mistakenly listed
Blue Ridge Bank (along with 126 others) among the banks which could
reach zero equity within one year.217 Here the defendant held itself out
as offering accurate information based on responsible sources. The very
purpose of the report would seem to be reliable factual information. Un-
til the mistaken listing, there was no public controversy about Blue
Ridge's financial stability. It is this social and literary context that
causes the reader to expect a precise and verifiable factual statement.
The Fourth Circuit properly found the statement to be actionable fact.
CONCLUSION
When distinguishing a constitutionally protected statement of opinion
from an actionable statement of fact, courts should emphasize and ex-
plicitly examine the context in which the disputed statement was made.
Because context, both literary and social, shapes the expectations of a
reasonable audience, a statement can be weighed for precision and ver-
ifiability only within a particular context.
Any other approach, emphasizing verifiability or drawing a bright-line
distinction between fact and opinion, confines opinion to an artificial and
abstract category and defeats the first amendment's goal of encouraging
beneficial and harmless speech. Fact can be separated from opinion only
by a conscious and explicit examination of context, with all the uncer-
tainties which that involves. There are no easy formulas.
Rodney W. Ott
213. See id. at 1131.
214. See id. at 1122.
215. Id. at 1131.
216. See Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1989).
217. See id.
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